From the publisher’s website:
Between November 1950 and the end of fighting in June 1953, China launched six major offensives against UN forces in Korea. The most important of these began on April 22, 1951, and was the largest Communist military operation of the war. The UN forces put up a strong defense, prevented the capture of the South Korean capital of Seoul, and finally pushed the Chinese back above the 38th parallel. After China’s defeat in this epic five-week battle, Mao Zedong and the Chinese leadership became willing to conclude the war short of total victory. China’s Battle for Korea offers new perspectives on Chinese decision making, planning, and execution; the roles of command, political control, and technology; and the interaction between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow, while providing valuable insight into Chinese military doctrine and the reasons for the UN’s military success.
Xiaobing Li is Professor and Chair of the Department of History and Geography and Director of the Western Pacific Institute at the University of Central Oklahoma. He is author, editor, or co-author of China at War; A History of the Modern Chinese Army; Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers (with Richard Peters); Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (with Allan R. Millett); and other books and articles on the Korean War. He served in the People’s Liberation Army in China.
Introduction: China’s War against America
1. Beijing’s Decision
2. From the Yalu to Seoul
3. The Last Attempt for Victory
4. The First Step: Three Problems
5. The Costly Offensive in the West
6. The Second Step: the Offensive in the East
7. Disastrous Withdraw to the North
8. From Battleground to Negotiating Table
Conclusion: What China Learned